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Jouissance is a Lacanian concept, infamous for being impervious to understanding and
which expresses the paradoxical satisfaction that a subject may derive from his symptom.
On the basis of Freud’s “experience of satisfaction” we have proposed a ﬁrst working
deﬁnition of jouissance as the (beneﬁt gained from) the motor tension underlying the
action which was [once] adequate in bringing relief to the drive and, on the basis of
their striking reciprocal resonances, we have proposed that central dopaminergic systems
could embody the physiological architecture of Freud’s concept of the drive.We have then
distinguished two constitutive axes to jouissance: one concerns the subject’s body and the
other the subject’s history. Four distinctive aspects of these axes are discussed both from
a metapsychological and from a neuroscience point of view. We conclude that jouissance
could be described as an accumulation of body tension, fuelling for action, but continuously
balancing between reward and anxiety, and both marking the physiology of the body with
the history of its commemoration and arising from this inscription as a constant push to act
and to repeat. Moreover, it seems that the mesolimbic accumbens dopaminergic pathway
is a reasonable candidate for its underlying physiological architecture.
Keywords: neuropsychoanalysis, jouissance, enjoyment, Lacan, addiction, reward, dopamine, psychoanalysis
INTRODUCTION
We previously proposed physiological frameworks to understand
a number of psychoanalytic concepts like repression and primary
process, as well as the Lacanian concept of the signiﬁer (Bazan,
2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012; Bazan and Snodgrass, 2012). The
topic of the present paper will be another Lacanian concept, jouis-
sance, which is quite untranslatable but has been translated before
as enjoyment (Evans, 1996). The concept itself is also infamous for
being impervious to understanding. Because the concept appears
relatively late in the teaching of Lacan, and only by bits and pieces,
we chose to start with a clinical description. Indeed, clinical expe-
rience leads us to unmistakably identify a human tendency to seek,
beyond themere pursuit of pleasure, for that which brings the sub-
ject into danger or for that which sabotages his life. In its purest
clinical form jouissance is what explains why people are addicted
to harmful, or even lethal, substances – e.g., why people cannot
stop smoking even after being diagnosed with lung cancer. Jouis-
sance thus expresses the paradoxical satisfaction that the subject
derives from his symptom (Evans, 1996, p. 92). In Mourning and
melancholia, for example, Freud (1917/1914–1916, p. 251) says
literally: “The self-tormenting in melancholia, (which) is without
doubt enjoyable:” the melancholic subject also gains satisfaction
from self-devaluation. Jouissance is a crucial concept for clinics, as
it explains why, against all rationality, subjects are often wedded
to their problems, be it at the highest price, i.e., at the cost of their
professional career, of their relationships or of their mere lives.
In the early seminars, Lacan (1975/1953–1954; 1978/1954–
1955) uses the term with a reference to its original, juridical,
meaning: the term arose in the XV century, to designate the action
of using a property for the purpose of obtaining the satisfaction it is
supposed to provide. It is akin in its meaning to the juridical con-
cept of “usufruct,” which is a right of enjoyment, enabling a holder
to derive proﬁt or beneﬁt from property that either is titled to another
person or which is held in common ownership, as long as the property
is not damaged or destroyed. There is an essential distinction to take
from these juridical deﬁnitions, which founds the notion of jouis-
sance: it is the distinction between the satisfaction of consuming
something, whereby it could be damaged, destroyed or lost in the
consumption, and the satisfaction of using something with this
satisfaction being explicitly not tied to its consumption. Several
Lacanian authors explicitly use this deﬁnition of jouissance in its
original juridical reference: e.g., Robin (2006, p. 29), in the context
of addiction, deﬁnes enjoyment as the proﬁt one can obtain from
something which he does not possess. Jadin (2012/2009, p. 42)
explains that abuse could be deﬁned as “treating the body of the
child as if one had usufruct of it.”
Later on in Lacan’s work, the sexual connotations of jouis-
sance become more apparent. It is in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis,
then, that (Lacan, 1986/1959–1960, p. 209) proposes that “jouis-
sance appears not purely and simply as the satisfaction of a
need, but as the satisfaction of a drive.” Indeed, up to 1957,
the term seems to mean no more than the enjoyable sensation
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that accompanies the satisfaction of a biological need such as
hunger (Lacan, 1994/1956–1957, p. 125), but in this seminar jouis-
sance and pleasure are distinguished. It is therefore that, starting
precisely from Freud’s model of drive, we will propose a metapsy-
chological understanding of the concept of jouissance which will
allow for an operationalisation in physiological terms. We have
organized our paper in two parts, a psychoanalytic (metapsycho-
logical) part followed by a (neuro-)physiological part. Moreover,
we have distinguished two constitutive axes to jouissance: one has
to do with the body and entails the aspects of (1) the drive, (2) the
experience of satisfaction and (3) the dimension of excess (of body
tension); the other has to do with the (subject’s) history and basi-
cally entails the commemoration of a trait, complying to repeat.
These four distinctive aspects are respectively discussed both from
a metapsychological and from a neuroscience point of view.
METAPSYCHOLOGY: FROM BODY TO HISTORY
BODY
Freud’s model of the drive
In Freud’s (1915) model, a drive has a source (a biological need
or lack), an aim (the satisfaction of that need), an object (ade-
quate in satisfying the need) and an impetus (a pressure pushing
to act). Hunger could, in this model, start with a biological signal,
such as low blood sugar sensed in the lateral hypothalamus (LH).
This lack is sensed by the central nervous system (symbolized by
ψ in Freud’s Project) where the lack accumulates as an excess of
endogenous quantities: “The nucleus of ψ is connected with the
paths by which endogenous quantities of excitation ascend. (…)
The ﬁlling of the nuclear neurones in ψ will have as its result an
effort to discharge, an urgency which is released along the motor
pathway. Experience shows that here the ﬁrst path to be taken is
that leading to internal change (expression of emotions, scream-
ing, vascular innervation). But no such discharge can produce an
unburdening result, since the endogenous stimulus continues to
be received and the ψ tension is restored” (Freud, 1956/1895a,
p. 317–318). In other words, the emptiness of the stomach is cen-
trally conveyed and results in an internal state of excitation, of
mobilisation of the organism. The newborn child reacts by an
undirected motor discharge, in a (vain) attempt to lower the body
tension. The baby giggles and screams. Freud (1956/1895a, p. 318)
continuous: “The removal of the stimulus is only made possible
here by an intervention which for the time being gets rid of the
release of Qη` (excitation quantity) in the interior of the body; and
this intervention calls for an alteration in the external world (sup-
ply of nourishment, proximity of the sexual object) which, as a
speciﬁc action, can only be brought about in deﬁnite ways. At ﬁrst,
the human organism is incapable of bringing about the speciﬁc
action. It takes place by extraneous help, when the attention of an
experienced person is drawn to the child’s state by discharge along
the path of internal state (e.g., by the child’s screaming). When
the helpful person has performed the work of the speciﬁc action
in the external world for the helpless one, the latter is in a posi-
tion, by means of reﬂex contrivances, immediately to carry out in
the interior of this body the activity necessary for removing the
endogenous stimulus. The total event then constitutes an expe-
rience of satisfaction (…).” The mother, or another conspeciﬁc,
hears the cries and thinks “he must be hungry,” she might take
the child and put him to her breast. In other words, the mother
interprets the cry (or the action) of the child. The child thereby
is enabled to release the sucking reﬂex and milk comes into the
body. Thereby, the need is satisﬁed an this very “removing (of)
the endogenous stimulus” is experienced as pleasure according to
Freud’s (1955/1920, p. 7–8) deﬁnition: “We have decided to relate
pleasure andunpleasure to the quantity of excitation that is present
in the mind but is not in way“bound,” and to relate them in such a
manner that unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity
of excitation and pleasure to a diminution.” The milk constitutes
an adequate response to the need which was at the source of the
discharge impetus (the cry) of the child. Thereby, and thanks to
the interpretation, the action acquires a speciﬁc status: it becomes
an adequate action (Freud, 1999/1895b, p. 108).
If the deﬁnition of pleasure in this scenario is clear, for Jadin
(2012/2009, p. 58), it is also “evident that the endogenous drives
(in the experience of satisfaction) constitute an aspect of jouis-
sance.” Indeed, Lacan (1986/1959–1960, p. 209) considers that
jouissance is the satisfaction of a drive, and not simply of the need
which is at its origin. Scherrer (2010, p. 143) even adds: “the aim
and object of the drive is pure enjoyment, without an object and
unconditionally.” It is at this point that we would like to propose a
ﬁrst operationalisation of the concepts of pleasure and jouissance:
indeed, we propose that in Freud’s model of the drive pleasure
is what results from the release of tension induced by the con-
sumption of a suitable object of the drive while jouissance is the
(beneﬁt gained from) the motor tension underlying the action
which was (once) adequate in bringing relief to the drive. In this
deﬁnition, both, pleasure and jouissance, can be aspects of satis-
faction of the drive, but, while pleasure implies the consumption
of an object, jouissance is in the motor mobilization or use of the
body – i.e., in the motor mobilization of those action pathways
that were (once) adequate in delivering pleasure. This deﬁnition
suits with the juridical origins of the word jouissance, where it was
reserved for the satisfaction of using something without consum-
ing it. Moreover, in the distinction here proposed pleasure is tied
to the object, while jouissance is related to motor action. This is in
agreement with e.g.,Marie (2004, p. 27) who says: “Jouissance (…)
is very close to l’Agieren, (…) according to its Latin etymology,
agere, i.e., accomplish, express by the movement. Any modality of
jouissance is of the order of the Agieren.”
Experience of satisfaction
The “experience of satisfaction” is a good place to start discussing
jouissance, e.g., Marie (2004 p. 25) says: “when the question of
enjoyment appears in the writings of Freud, in The Project, it is
about the experience of satisfaction of the drive economy.” Let’s
go back to Freud (1956/1895a, p. 318): “The total event then con-
stitutes an experience of satisfaction, which has the most radical
results on the development of the individual’s functions. For three
things occur in theψ system: (1) a lasting discharge is effected and
so the urgency which had produced unpleasure in ω is brought
to an end; (2) a cathexis of one (or several) of the neurons which
correspond to the perception of an object occurs in the pallium;
and (3) at other points of the pallium information arrives of the
discharge of the released reﬂex movement which follows upon the
speciﬁc action. A facilitation is then formedbetween these cathexes
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and the nuclear neurones.” The pallium, in Freud’s vocabulary, is
the part of the central nervous system which is connected with
the outer body (speciﬁc senses and striated muscles) while the
nuclear neurons innervate the inner body (the viscera)1. Freud
(1956/1895a, p. 312) adds that “ω is assumed to be ﬁlled from ψ,”
in other words, it is the (“nucleus” of the) central nervous system
which informsω2 of the actual values of the homeostatic situation
in the inner body.
In other words, the experience of satisfaction is as much the
adequate resolve of a drive tension than it is the “radical result” of
it, namely a lasting facilitation of the associations between a state
of body tension at the level of a neural comparator system (ω),
a perceptual image of an adequate object, and a motor represen-
tation of an action adequate in resolving the tension. As a result:
“(…) when the state of urgency or wishing re-appears (from ψ
to ω), the cathexis will also pass over on to the two memories
and will activate them. Probably the mnemic image of the object
will be the ﬁrst to be affected by the wishful activation. I do not
doubt that in the ﬁrst instance this wishful activation will produce
the same thing as a perception – namely a hallucination” (Freud,
1956/1895a, p. 319). We would now add that the wishful activa-
tion will also produce a motor body tension, and that this motor
tension would then be equivalent to the Lacanian concept of jouis-
sance. The biological needs are capable of inducing a reserve of
motor tension, which will be recruited to act in order to meet the
1Note that this roughly corresponds to the divide between the brainstem and limbic
system, innervating the vegetative functions of the internal body and the neocortex,
innervating the sensory systems and the motor control of the external body.
2Freud’sω-neurones are a real headbreaker: they are“excited along with perception”
Freud (1956/1895a, p. 309),“behave like organs of perception, and in them we could
ﬁnd no place for a memory” Freud (1956/1895a, p. 309) while “These neurones
must have a discharge, however small (…). The discharge will, like all others, go
in the direction of motility (…).” Freud (1956/1895a, p. 311). Freud (1956/1895a,
p. 309) needs to think them to understand how physical entities (e.g., stimuli),
which structurally are quantities, become mental entities characterized by quality.
As to their working principle, Freud proposed that they are incapable of receiving
stimuli, “but that instead they appropriate the period of excitation and that this state
of theirs of being affected by period while they are ﬁlled with the minimum of Qη`
[quantities, stimuli] is the fundamental basis of consciousness” Freud (1956/1895a,
p. 311) and indeed “consciousness is the subjective side of one part of the physical
processes in the nervous system, namely of the ω processes.”We propose that these
ω-neurones could stand for comparator systems in general, which very much work
like thermostats comparing set-values with actual values (see also Bazan, 2007).
They allow absolute quantity amount to acquire, by comparison, value labels (e.g.,
“so much short of,” “so much in excess of,” etc.), i.e., they transform quantities in
qualities. The confusion about them being sensory or motor would be logical as
they comprise a sensory monitoring directly connected to a possible (disinhibition
of) discharge. Moreover, Freud adds: “unpleasure would have to be regarded as
coinciding with a raising of the level of Qη` or an increasing quantitative pressure; it
would be the ω sensation when there is an increase of Qη` in ψ. Pleasure would be
the sensation of discharge.” We are tempted to translate this as follows: at the level
of the comparator the more the set value and the actual value differ, the more this is
unpleasurable, while when they coincide, there is discharge and, consequently, relief,
which is pleasurable. And then: “Pleasure and unpleasure would be the sensations
in ω of its own cathexis, of its own level; and here ω and ψ would, as it were,
represent intercommunicating vessels. In this manner the quantitative processes
in ψ too would reach consciousness, once more as qualities” (Freud, 1956/1895a,
p. 312). The idea of “intercommunicating vessels” could ﬁt with these comparator
systems which are, indeed, continuously balancing neurons ﬁring for target values
(e.g., efference copies) and afferent information which has already gone through
ψ, the central nervous system. The cryptic “period” which Freud refers to, could
tentatively be understood as the intensity of ﬁring of the one and the other type of
neurons, i.e., at the level of the neural comparator systems the only point which still
matters is to balance out the intensity levels of both informations.
demands of life, and this reserve of motor tension is equivalent to
jouissance: “A little bit of jouissance, a certain excess is nevertheless
necessary from the start. Indeed, the necessities or demands of life
(Not des Lebens) are such that the nervous system needs to gather
a reserve amount to face them” (Jadin, 2012/2009, p. 58).
A question at this point, then, is if this state of body tension is
in and by itself in some ways satisfying? It is difﬁcult to decide this
question. It could be that body tension has an inherently reward-
ing effect (see further), but it could also be that the dimension of
enjoyment more particularly refers to (an) inaugural experience(s)
of satisfaction. For example, Scherrer (Freymann et al., 2012, p. 7)
says: “The drive is caused by the search, the sting of the recovery of
the hallucinatory revival of a previous experience of satisfaction.
Hallucination of which we may assume that it was accompanied
by an unprecedented pleasure, particularly intense, excessive, incom-
mensurate with the pleasure associated with the simple release of
tension of the need” (Italics added).
Excess of body tension
For Lacan (1986/1959–1960, p. 42; 1965–1966, p. 137; 1999/1972–
1973, p. 26), a body “is something that is made to enjoy, to enjoy
itself,” “it belongs to a body to enjoy” and “a body is there to be
enjoyed.” To understand this, let’s push the Lacanian understand-
ing of jouissance a little bit further. In the inaugural experience of
satisfaction of hunger, the baby is given the breast by his mother.
In a following frontal encounter with the breast, the suckingmove-
ment will be released. Jadin (2012/2009, p. 58–59): “But the case
may be that the breast is seen from the side. Discharge, then, is
delayed and will only take place after a certain search, for exam-
ple by means of a movement of the head. For this quest, the
child must in a ﬁrst time decompose the perception, this is the
Urteilen (…) (the judging). The child will perceive at the one
hand something identical and speciﬁc of the breast, the thing
itself of the breast, the Thing (das Ding) seen from the front,
and on the other hand, an element that may vary. When this
variable element is strange, the child will delay the discharge.
(…) You can see that the Thing is something very speciﬁc. It is
present at the same time when the object satisfying the drive is
effectively perceived, and when the object is only imagined as
complete, anticipated by desire. The Thing is the portion always
invested by the jouissance (…). In the system of neurons described
by Freud that Thing of the perceptual complex corresponds to a
nuclear neuron of the brain which is continuously invested, con-
tinuously ﬁlled by endogenous quantities, the production of which
is constant.”
In our opinion, the notion of jouissance thus seems to balance
between two kinds of body tension. The notion of “body ten-
sion” is a kind of readiness to act, a motor preparedness, which
is probably situated mostly centrally, as an activation level of the
central nervous system, but some of which may percolate to the
body through subthreshold peripheral motor commands and exe-
cutions (e.g., mini-contractions). At the one hand, there is the
body tension, which we referred to before, speciﬁcally preparing
an adequate act, which was once accomplished before during an
experience of satisfaction. We propose that this part would then
correspond to the variable part, as it is activated in reaction to an
“attribute” (or an “affordance,” in cognitive term; Gibson, 1977)
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which functions as a handle for manipulation of the object; as a
consequence, it can be represented. At the other hand, there is the
body tension, which is induced by the constant “and speciﬁc” part
of the object, the essence of the thing, das Ding itself, which allows
it to be identiﬁed as such even if the usual attributes for grasping
it have changed. What we propose goes as follows: as the thing
is identiﬁed – i.e., identiﬁed from a past experience of satisfac-
tion, as a potentially satisfying object – it induces body tension,
which will be needed to act upon it, but as the usual “handles”
have changed, this body tension is yet without clear motor exe-
cution form. We could say that it has not yet moved (very far) to
the motor discharge part of the mental apparatus. Probably this
second reading of jouissance is closer to Lacan’s (1986/1959–1960)
concept of “enjoyment of the Thing.” Jadin (2012/2009, p. 38)
says that Lacan presents jouissance “in some ways as this which
resists to attribution3” and further on he adds: “Jouissance, the
Thing, is thus that which precedes a certain manipulation. It dates
from (the time) before the hand” (Jadin, 2012/2009, p. 50). It is
(more) easily understood, then, why this jouissance is considered
“out-of-representation” (see also Hoffmann, 2012/2009, p. 9): the
reserve of body tension has not yet been destined to a determined
motor form, which is the basis for representation (see further).
Perhaps we could also say it is still very much biological, and not
yet mental?
We should also consider the possibility that it is only in this sec-
ond scenario that, by chance or by surprise, ﬁnding the “adequate”
way to grasp the object will be “accompanied by an unprece-
dented pleasure, particularly intense, excessive, incommensurate
with the pleasure associated with the simple release of tension of
the need,” and that this is what speciﬁcally underlies the power-
fully satisfying dimension of jouissance. But maybe, once found,
a new share of body tension shifts to the mental side, where
it can be represented. However, the successful mobilization of
this share of body tension, though it will be activated at a new
encounter with the Thing, won’t be able to induce the same
extent of gratiﬁcation as the ﬁrst time. But at the other hand,
if a pathway of discharge is not found, tension may accumu-
late and this, then, might lead to the experience of pain. Freud
(1955/1920, p. 63) says: “Our consciousness communicates to us
feelings from within not only of pleasure and unpleasure but also
of a peculiar tension which in its turn can be either pleasurable
or unpleasurable” (Italics added). Indeed “jouissance is suffering”
(Lacan, 1986/1959–1960, p. 185) and “What I call jouissance – in
the sense in which the body experiences itself – is always in the
nature of tension, in the nature of a forcing, of a spending, even
of an exploit. Unquestionably, there is jouissance at the level at
which pain begins to appear, and we know that it is only at this
level of pain that a whole dimension of the organism,which would
otherwise remain veiled, can be experienced” (Lacan, 1966–1967,
p. 60; Italics added). We see now also how the pleasure principle
thus functions as “a limit to enjoyment” (Lacan, 1991/1969–1970)
when it discharges shares of the body tension, bringing relief, and
3“Referring to the two judgments which must be applied toward a thing, the judg-
ment of existence and the judgment of attribution, Freud holds that one can assign
an inﬁnite number of attributes to a thing, to The Thing, to the ousia. When Lacan
argues that jouissance is ousia, he presents it in some ways as this which resists to
attribution, as that which is excluded from the attribution judgment (…).”
thus pleasure, and limiting the amount of (painful) jouissance
tension.
HISTORY
Commemoration of a trait, complying to repeat
The radical result of the experience of satisfaction is a facilitation
or memory trace “between two mnemic images and the nuclear
neurones which are cathected in the state of urgency” (Freud,
1956/1895a, p. 319)4 . It is the cathexis of the nuclear neurones
(which coming fromψﬁllsω)which induces a facilitation between
the mnemic image of the satisfying object and the (once) adequate
motor act. When Freud (1949/1905) says in: “This satisfaction (of
a drive) must have been previously experienced in order to have
left behind a need for its repetition; and we may expect that Nature
will have made safe provisions so that this experience of satisfac-
tion shall not be left to chance” (Freud, 1949/1905, p. 184; Italics
added), we may assume that these “provisions” minimally entail
the described inscription of the memory traces. But these are not
just passive traces: indeed, they“leave behind a need for their repe-
tition.” Freud (1955/1920, p. 42) explains how this goes in Beyond
the pleasure principle: “The repressed instinct never ceases to strive
for complete satisfaction, which would consist in the repetition
of a primary experience of satisfaction (…) it is the difference in
amount between the pleasure of satisfaction which is demanded
and that which is actually achieved that provides the driving fac-
tor5 which will permit of no halting at any position attained, but,
in the poet’s words, “ungebändigt immer vorwärts dringt’.6” In
other words, the traces are not simply sitting there but are contin-
uously activated by the insisting incoming stream from the source
of the drive.
Lacan (1991/1969–1970, p. 111–112) comments: “In 1920,
what Freud is dealingwith in the exploration of the unconscious, is
repetition7. (…) Repetition is the denoting, the precise denotation
of a trait (…) being identical to the unary trait, to the little stroke,
to the element of writing, of a trait in so far as it commemorates an
irruption of enjoyment.” Freud (1949/1905, p. 1212) says, speak-
ing about thumb sucking, that the child is “is determined by a
search for some pleasure8 which has already been experienced and
is now remembered.” Repetition, thus, is the commemoration of
4Freud explains a mechanism of how such a memory trace may come about: “Now
there is a basic law of association by simultaneity, which operates in the case of pure
ψ activity, of reproductive remembering, and which is the foundation of all links
between the ψ neurones. We ﬁnd that (…) quantitative cathexis of a ψ neurone, α,
passes over to another, β, if α and β have at some time been simultaneously cathected
from (or fromelsewhere) [Italics added]. Thusa contact-barrier has been facilitated
through the simultaneous cathexis α–β.” – with , being the “permeable” neurones
at the periphery of the mental apparatus, both perceptual or motor neurones. Note
that Freud’s description is equivalent toHebb’s (1949) law and explains how the easy
connexion between two neurones comes about by being ﬁrst both simultaneously
activated from elsewhere.
5Freud seems to allude to the idea that this incoming stream is compared with a set
value in a comparator type monitoring mechanism such as what we have proposed
for ω.
6“Presses ever forward unsubdued.”Mephistopheles in Faust, Part 1 [Scene 4].
7Our translation of “En 1920, ce à quoi Freud a affaire dans l’exploration de
l’inconscient, c’est la répétition.” Which we prefer above the ofﬁcial translation
which is “This is even what Freud discovered precisely around 1920.”
8This pleasure here is jouissance, the enjoyment of the body tension which was once
adequate in bringing pleasure.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 709 | 4
“fnhum-07-00709” — 2013/11/5 — 20:32 — page 5 — #5
Bazan and Detandt Jouissance and dopamine
an irruption of enjoyment. Lacan (1986/1959–1960, p. 209): “the
drive as such is something extremely complex (…) It embodies a
historical dimension whose true signiﬁcance needs to be appre-
ciated by us. This historical tendency is deﬁned by this, by this
mark, consisting of the drive presenting itself with a certain insis-
tence, in its status of referring to something memorable because
it was remembered9. Remembering, “historicizing,” is coextensive
with the functioning of the drive in the human psyche.” We can
read here the reference to Freud’s facilitation induced by the drive
between the two mnemic images, brought about by the experi-
ence of satisfaction. This coupling of events forms a trait or a
mark, commemorating an irruption of enjoyment, and induc-
ing a relentless tendency to repeat: “The compulsion to repeat
and (drive) satisfaction which is immediately pleasurable seem to
converge here into an intimate partnership” (Freud, 1955/1920,
p. 23).
Therefore, taking all this together, we are inclined to think that
the experience of satisfaction, having been in itself an experience
of jouissance, leaves behind a powerfulmemory trace,whichwill be
readily activated whenever a similar body need or drive situation
is aroused, or when “the Thing” is reencountered, thereby induc-
ing a reactivation of the memory images of this (once) satisfying
object as well as of the (once) satisfying action. This reactivation
will bring about in and by itself jouissance through motor tension.
This tension might procure (some) enjoyment, especially if some
new motor pathway to approach the object has been thought out.
Remarkably, this enjoyment then will be released quite indepen-
dently of the object and action still satisfying the drive from which
they historically originated.
PHYSIOLOGY: THE DOPAMINERGIC PATHWAYS
BODY
Model of the drive: mobilise the external body from within
In the natural history of life, it is with the ﬁrst vertebrates 520
million years ago that the striated, or voluntary, muscles emerge as
the system to move the newly invented internal skeleton (see also
Bazan, 2008). Vertebrates, then, are schematically constituted of
two bodies: an internal body, the invertebrate body, consisting of
the so-called vegetative systems for blood circulation, respiration,
digestion, excretion, sudation, reproduction etc., and an external
body, consisting of the skeleton and the striated or skeletalmuscles.
These bodies having been in some ways superposed the one upon
the other in the course of evolution, for the organism to function
efﬁciently, there must be a system that adjusts the signalling of
internal body needs (e.g., oxygen, food, hydration, sex objects) to
speciﬁc actions of the external body which can alleviate these body
needs.
A ﬁrst physiologic understanding of the Freudian concept of
the drive, then, would be the dynamics whereby a body ten-
sion, originating from a need in the internal body, mobilises
9Our translation of “Cette tendance historique se déﬁnit en ceci, dans cette marque
que la pulsion se présente dans une certaine insistance, en tant qu’elle se rapporte
à quelque chose de mémorable parce que mémorisé.” which we prefer above the
ofﬁcial translation which is “This dimension is to be noted in the insistence that
characterizes its appearances; it refers back to something memorable because it was
remembered.”
the external body and instigates it to action. One key hypoth-
esis then is that central dopaminergic systems could embody the
physiological architecture of Freud’s concept of the drive. In the
striatum, dopamine (DA) serves as a critical motor action signal;
increases in DA are associated with increases in motor output,
and decreases in DA with inhibition of behavior. In the case of
the mesolimbic pathway, the ventral tegmental area (VTA) inner-
vates the nucleus accumbens shell (NAS), which is part of the
corpus striata (basal ganglia); this system is therefore referred to
as NAS-DA. This is also the so-called SEEKING system of which
the neuroscientist Panksepp (1998, p. 145; 144) says that when
this system is stimulated: “organisms deploy the most energized
exploratory and search behaviors an animal is capable of exhibit-
ing : e.g., stimulated rats move about excitedly, snifﬁng vigorously,
pausing at times to investigate various nooks and crannies of their
environment,” or else: “The desires and aspirations of the human
heart are endless. (…) But they all come to a standstill if cer-
tain brain systems, such as the DA circuits arising from midbrain
nuclei are destroyed. (...) These circuits appear to be major con-
tributors to our feelings of engagement and excitement as we seek
the material resources needed for bodily survival. (...) Without the
synaptic “energy”of DA these potentials remain dormant and still.
(...) When DA synapses are active in abundance, a person feels as
if he or she can do anything.”
The psychoanalyst and neuroscientiﬁc researcher Howard
Shevrin has previously made a convincing case that Panksepp’s
SEEKINGsystemcould stand as aphysiological correlate of Freud’s
concept of the drive (Shevrin, 2003). Shevrin (2003) indicates how
the four parts of the SEEKINGsystemare remarkably similar to the
four parts of Freud’s deﬁnition of drive and proposes to illustrate
this with a simple table (Table 1).
Indeed, Panksepp’s SEEKING system is made up of four parts:
regulatory imbalances, consummation, external stimulus, and
powerful states of expectancy or anticipation, while Freud’s archi-
tecture of the drive is also made of four parts. Shevrin (2003)
proposes the following parallels: the regulatory imbalances in
Panksepp’s model are the underlying speciﬁc need states such as
hunger, thirst, and sex; thus they correspond with the somatic
source of the drive. Consummation refers to the satisfying of
the underlying need state, which is what corresponds to the
aim of the Freudian drive. External stimulus refers to the object
providing the consummatory satisfaction, the most variable com-
ponent. Concerning the fourth component, Panksepp’s “powerful
states of expectancy or anticipation,” they refer to the activa-
tion of the NAS-DA. According to Panksepp (1998, p. 145),
Table 1 | Shevrin’s (2003) proposition of the parallels between the four
parts of Panksepp’s SEEKING system and the four parts of Freud’s
definition of the drive.
Panksepp’s SEEKING system Freud’s drive theory
Regulatory imbalances Somatic source (Quelle)
Consummation Aim (Ziel )
External stimulus Object (Objekt )
Energetic activity Motor factor (Drang)
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activation of this system is characterized by a “psychic energiza-
tion.” When it is activated “…animals perform a large number
of motivated goal-seeking behaviors. If this system is damaged, a
generalized behavioral inertia results” (Panksepp, 1998, p. 150).
Shevrin (2003) indicates that Panksepp’s inference concerning
the subjective state of the animal when the NAS-DA circuits is
activated, “is based on the intense motor activity of the animal
engaging in exploratory activity. In other words the animal is
according to Panksepp, energetically active. This clearly impli-
cates a motor factor. Moreover, the activation of the NAS-DA
circuits results in an animal engaging in effortful behavior, in
Freud’s terms, a demand for work is being made in the most
basic meaning of the word work.” In this sense, the “power-
ful states or expectancy or anticipation” also correspond quite
precisely to Freud’s component of motor pressure. We therefore
propose that the functioning of the (mesolimbic) dopaminergic
pathways could embody a physiological counterpart of Freud’s
drive concept10.
Let’s again take the case of hunger. Indeed, Panksepp (1998,
p. 167) states: “The SEEKING system, under the guidance of
various regulatory imbalances, external incentive cues and past
learning, helps take thirsty animals to water, cold animals to
warmth, hungry animals to food, and sexually aroused animals
toward opportunities for orgasmic gratiﬁcation.” However, if we
want to apply this model to the “simple” situation of a hungry
baby crying for food the ﬁrst time, we run into an endless series
of complications. First, there are many redundant mechanisms
to ensure adequate food consumption any of which may be suf-
ﬁcient to stimulate food intake. Second, the pathways from the
internal homeostatic receptor systems detecting various bodily
imbalances and inducing the activation of the SEEKING sys-
tem, i.e., inducing DA-release, are multiple. It is beyond our
goal and expertise to give an overview of these, but it seems that
the brain architecture underlying appetitive motivation is gener-
ally compatible with a drive concept embodied by dopaminergic
transmission. For example, if we want to go from hunger to the
mobilisation of the external body, the hypothalamus seems a good
place to start. It is well established that the arcuate nucleus of
the hypothalamus receives humoral signals, both from various
nutrients and from various hormones, regarding the status of
peripheral energy stores and conveys this information to the lateral
hypothalamic area (Elmquist et al., 1999). The LH inﬂuences vol-
untary somatic motor systems governing complex food-searching
and food-related behavior. If the LH is activated and food is not
present, animals act very aroused, are hyperactive, and appear to
engage in searching or foraging behavior (Kelley et al., 2005a,b).
Moreover, this LH involvement seems to imply dopaminergic
pathways. The lateral hypothalamic corridor between the LH and
10Other neuroscientiﬁc authors have also made propositions in the same line,
though probably not with Freud’s concept of the drive in mind: e.g., Kupfermann
et al. (2000, p. 998) in their seminal work Principles of neural science propose that
the mesolimbic DA transmission appears to represent a state of motivation or drive
wherein drive states can be understood as a state of tension due to a physiological
need or homeostatic imbalance. Drives direct behavior toward a goal, able to rein-
stall homeostasis via consumption of an object (e.g., food). Moreover, they increase
general alertness, energizing an individual to act appropriately in a given situation,
in order to obtain a goal.
the VTA is part of the Medial Forebrain Bundle which runs from
the VTA to the NAS. The LH also has direct connections with the
accumbens shell giving the NAS a privileged access to hypothala-
mic energy-sensing substrates; however, the LH also more directly
reaches widespread areas of striatum (beyond the accumbens) via
midline thalamic projection (for review, see Kelley et al., 2005a).
In other words, dopaminergic innervation of the striatum, both
ventral and dorsal, is involved in food intake, and this system is
concerned with motor activation and foraging strategies associ-
ated with changing motivational conditions (Haberny et al., 2004;
Haberny and Carr, 2005). The complexity of these pathways,
however, is huge and there are discrepant opinions in different
authors11. What is important in the present exercise, is not to
show that the dopaminergic transmission is a necessary condi-
tion for the engagement in appetitive behavior, but to show that
the architecture of the brain is broadly compatible with the drive
mechanism as embodied by dopaminergic transmission, i.e., that
it is a possible pathway. Indeed, the ﬁrst experience of satisfac-
tion, the ﬁrst cry of the hungry baby may have a quite different
physiology as the adult “routine” hunger usually studied in neu-
rosciences. Concretely, when Freud indicates that “The nucleus of
ψ is connected with the paths by which endogenous quantities of
excitation ascend. (…) The ﬁlling of the nuclear neurones in ψ
will have as its result an effort to discharge, an urgency which is
released along the motor pathway,” it seems that, given the data
summarised above, we are in a position to propose to translate this
as: “the central dopaminergic systems are connected with paths
which convey information of the internal homeostatic situation
of the body, e.g., through the LH. Ascending excitations, indi-
cating, e.g., a food depletion centrally, will lead to release of DA,
which will lead to motor mobilisation.”
But how can we now situate the proposed difference between
pleasure and jouissance in this physiologicalmodel? Shevrin (2003)
underlines that it has been established across many animal species
that once an animal is conditioned to expect a reward following
the appearance of a conditioned stimulus such as a light, that
at a certain point it will begin to treat the light as if it were the
reward itself, in particular if no reward has been forthcoming. A
pigeon, for example, will begin to peck at the light even though
its pecking has nothing whatsoever to do with the appearance of
the reward. This phenomenon is called autoshaping, that is, says
Shevrin (2003) “the animal’s own response, the pecking, becomes
intrinsically rewarding.” When the NAS-DA circuit is artiﬁcially
blocked with antagonists, the autoshaping disappears (e.g., Di
Ciano et al., 2001). Shevrin (2003) comments: “(...) it is not the
anticipation of some consummatory pleasure that is involved, a
totally different matter, but a pleasure of some sort intrinsic to
drive activation. Consummatory pleasure and, if I may call it that,
drive pleasure are two different things. The ﬁrst I submit is an emo-
tion or affect in the usual sense; the second is a unique state of
expectation or anticipation that is intrinsically gratifying, but not
pleasurable in the usual sense. It is entirely expressed through action,
11For example, even if a speciﬁc role for themedial accumbens shell in food-directed
behavior and food consumption was indeed demonstrated (Stratford and Kelley,
1997; Reynolds andBerridge,2001),Kelley et al. (2005a) sumsup anumber of results
which seem difﬁcult to reconcile with the idea that dopaminergic transmission is
necessary for appetitive approach.
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rather than accompanying action as is the case with consummatory
pleasure12” [Italics added]. Shevrin’s concept of consummatory
pleasure seems to parallel Freud’s concept of pleasure, resulting
from the release of tension induced by the consumption of a
“suitable” object (of the drive). Shevrin’s difference between con-
summatory and drive pleasure therefore parallels quite nicely our
own distinction between pleasure and jouissance, with jouissance
deﬁned as the beneﬁt gained from the motor tension underlying
the action brought about by the drive, and it allows us to situ-
ate the concept of jouissance at the level of the intrinsic NAS-DA
activation.
These distinctions are also in a remarkable resonance with
another neuroscientiﬁc distinction. Indeed Berridge (1996), as
well as Robinson and Berridge (1993, 2000, 2003), propose a dis-
tinction between wanting and liking. It was ﬁrst these author’s
merit to master two different ways of measuring appreciation in
rats: at the one hand, the hedonic (liking) or aversive reactions
are measured on the basis of facial reactions (some of which are
conserved over different species); at the other hand the wanting is
measured on the basis of the amount of motor activation which
the organism is ready to invest in order to obtain the reward.
These distinctive parameters allowed for the dissociation of two
anatomical circuits (Berridge, 1996): the wanting circuit corre-
sponds with the mesolimbic NAS-DA of Panksepp’s SEEKING
system, the liking circuit corresponds with so-called “opioid hot-
spots,” involving among others the shell of the nucleus accumbens,
the ventral pallidum and the parabrachial nucleus of the pons
in the brain stem. These circuits function independently of each
other. For example, considerable research with the taste reactivity
test has demonstrated that interference with DA failed to alter
appetitive taste reactivity for sucrose (Berridge and Robinson,
1998). Also, enhancing DA neurotransmission is not sufﬁcient
to produce pleasurable subjective effects in humans (Rothman
and Glowa, 1995). This has led Robinson and Berridge (1993)
to conclude that, though the original hypothesis emphasized the
role that pleasure played in mediating the effects of dopaminergic
manipulations, brain DA does not mediate liking. Nevertheless,
DA systems are involved in wanting of natural and drug reward
(see Berridge, 2007); this wanting is determined by the intensiﬁca-
tion of the wanting circuits quite independently of liking. Indeed,
work of these authors shows that activation of DA systems enables
or increases behavioral responses necessary for obtaining a goal
object, while interference with DA potently affects the willingness
of the animal to engage in behavioral actions aimed at anticipating
or foraging for food (e.g., Berridge, 1996). It is therefore tempting
to draw a parallel between these physiological ﬁndings and the psy-
choanalytic concepts: Berridge’s wanting and the psychoanalytic
concept of the drive bear some similarities for as far as they both
concern the readiness to engage in a motor behavioral effort13.
12Interestingly, Salamone et al. (2007, p. 465) summarize in a footnote a number
of comparable distinctions which several authors have made between two kinds
of gratiﬁcations: e.g., activational versus directional; preparatory versus consum-
matory; instrumental versus consummatory; anticipatory versus consummatory;
ethanol seeking versus ethanol intake; anticipatory versus hedonic.
13Similarly, Robinson and Berridge’s liking and the psychoanalytic concept of plea-
sure bear some similarities for as far as they both concern a pleasure or hedonic
experience upon consummation of an object. However, pleasure in the Freudian
In summary, the proposition that the central dopaminergic
systems, and in particular the NAS-DA system, could embody a
physiological counterpart of the psychoanalytic concept of jouis-
sance, seems to be coherent both with the drive-dimension of
jouissance and with an understanding of jouissance as the ben-
eﬁt gained from the motor tension underlying the action which
was (once) adequate in bringing relief to the drive, as Shevrin
points out with the phenomenon of e.g., autoshaping. Further-
more, through Shevrin’s distinction between consummatory and
drive pleasure, we can see how the Lacanian distinction between
pleasure and jouissance might reﬂect or parallel a number of exclu-
sively neuroscience-based distinction, as well as, prominently, the
distinction between liking and wanting.
Experience of satisfaction: tag the action associated to a reward
A second aspect of the jouissance-NAS-DA convergence would be
a convergence around some way of marking the adequate act. The
psychoanalytic idea would be that the adequate act, which is also
pleasurable, gets is some ways “tagged” during the experience of
satisfaction and we have proposed that it is this tagging by expe-
rience that will readily reactivate the speciﬁc motor pattern when
a comparable situation of need is measured by the ω-neurones.
The reactivation of this body tension was tentatively understood
as jouissance. Now, it is well characterised that the presentation of
a rewarding stimulus, whose reward value cannot be anticipated,
produces a burst of DA ﬁring (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). This
could ﬁt the psychoanalytic model if some conditions are met.
First, the idea of reward should also (partially) cover the Freudian
dimension of pleasure, in the sense that the rewarding stimulus
should procure tension relief, in particular by being an adequate
response to a bodily imbalance situation. Second, it is then this
pleasure which should induce the DA release. Third, the effect
of this DA should (also) be on the level of the actions involved
by stimulus rather than (exclusively) on the stimulus itself and in
some ways tag these actions so as to distinguish them from other
actions.
First, is the “reward” of the physiological observations compa-
rable to theFreudianpleasure? Salamone et al. (2007, p. 462) deﬁne
reward as a positive reinforcer with emotional effects, such as
sense is deﬁned as a relief of body tension due to the satisfaction of a bodily need.
Liking, at the other hand, is brought about by stimulation of the opioid hot-spots
which react by innate pathways to the “orosensory properties” (i.e., its sweet taste
and fatty ﬂavors), to some extent independently from the information on the home-
ostatic situation of the internal body (Sclafani, 2004). Of course, this schema works
for as long as we stick with “basic” drives which are so fundamental to life and con-
served over evolution that they have strong innate foundations. But there are many
other internal body tensions which can arise in the course of our ﬁrst interactions
with our primary caregivers besides hunger, especially in the human species – which
of all species is the most dependent of his ﬁrst caregivers. It would be interesting
to ﬁnd out if homeostatic relief, in general, can lead to opioid activation and if this
opioid activation could serve as a criterion for the dopaminergic tagging of the asso-
ciated action. Different elements point in that direction, since, e.g., the homeostatic
state can modulate the rewarding value of a stimulus, but the total picture remains
unclear. Now, for the model to function beyond more innate drives like hunger
(where associated criteria like sweetness may sufﬁce as a criterion for the adequacy
of action), i.e., for the model to function in more typically human situations, the
dopaminergic reward system should be able to take into account the situation of
the internal body as a criterion for tagging actions. In this sense the NAS-DA being
informed of this homeostatic information is sufﬁcient (see further) and the opioid
activation may or may not constitute a correlate of the Freudian concept of pleasure.
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feelings of pleasure. The term reinforcer goes back to Thorndike’s
(1911) “Law of Effect” which says that “any act which in a given
situation produces satisfaction becomes associated with that situ-
ation so that when the situation recurs the act is more likely than
before to recur also.” This is basically the same as what Freud says
for the experience of satisfaction, but Freud gives a criterion for
pleasure: he refers to a lasting discharge the information of which
is conveyed by theω neurones, which are ﬁlled with the (subcorti-
cal and brainstem) neurones in connection with the internal body.
So, yes, there is some equivalence between the Freudian concept of
“pleasure” and the cognitive concept of “reward”with this proviso
that in the cognitive concept no concrete criterion for“satisfaction”
is included.
Second, is it then this pleasure which induces the DA release?
The neuroscience ﬁndings show that it is only when the reward
is unexpected that there is a burst of DA ﬁring (Schultz, 1998).
So, (Freudian) pleasure does not per se lead to DA release, but
can it in principle do so, e.g., at some inaugural occasion or in
some important need situation? Food in a hungry animal is a very
strong reward, but it is probable that here a number of innate cri-
teria (e.g., sweetness) are the triggers for the DA release, and not
essentially the relief of the inner body imbalance. However, DA
can signal the salience of a variety of potential reward and reward-
related cues (Schultz, 1998) and DA appears to play a broad role
in motor behavior, rather than a speciﬁc role in food intake (Verty
et al., 2004; Kelley et al., 2005b). If so, there must be a mechanism
beyond the innate which function as a criterion for DA release. It
remains unclear how strong, e.g., the role for homeostatic cues of
the internal body is in the triggering of DA release, but a contri-
bution of this mechanism is probable given the modulatory role
of e.g., satiety on DA release, and should play a more important
role for acquired action pathways to ﬁnd pleasure, or to avoid
unpleasure, in complex unanticipable (human) situations.
Now, when encountering such an unexpected reward, DA neu-
rons often produce phasic bursts of activity including multiple
spikes (Schultz, 1998). Strikingly, these phasic bursts, which are
in this moment perceived as pleasurable (Bromberg-Martin et al.,
2010), could be some physiological counterpart of the dimension
of enjoyment which we have attributed especially to the inaugural
experience of satisfaction, “an unprecedented pleasure, particularly
intense, excessive, incommensurate with the pleasure associated with
the simple release of tension of the need.” The pleasure here is not to
be understood in the Freudian sense, since, indeed,DAand accum-
bens neurons do not discharge during actual consumption of an
expected reward, when the most pleasure is presumably experi-
enced (Schultz, 1992, 1998). It is another kind of pleasure, namely
jouissance. Strikingly, we are reminded of Freud’s (1955/1920,
p. 35) words: “Novelty is always the condition of enjoyment.”
Thus, DA neuron responses are not triggered by reward con-
sumption per se, except if the reward was unexpected. Instead, DA
neurons discharge in anticipation of reward (Koob and Volkow,
2010). Indeed, DA neurons are excited when a cue indicates an
increase in future reward value. Alluding to the higher described
phenomena of auto-shaping, Volkow et al. (2012, p. 9–10) say
that “the mere prediction of a reward may eventually become the
reward (…) this type of functional “switch”has also been reported
for natural reinforcers, which are likely to induce an equivalent
and gradual shift in DA increases (…) in the transition from a
novel stimulus that is inherently rewarding to that of the associ-
ated cues that predict it14.”Berridge and Robinson (1998) propose
that the phasic DA-bursts create a state of motivation to seek reward
(see also Salamone et al., 2007). They motivate the individual to
obtain the hedonic reward “so that the individual almost cannot
sit still” (Berridge, 2007, p. 408). This DA release is necessary
for reward cues to cause an increase in general motivation to per-
formreward-seeking actions (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010, p. 15).
Knutson et al. (2001, p. 271) suggest that the nucleus accumbens
“may provide the motivational “engine” that fuels attainment of
immediate reward.” This characteristic of behavior has enormous
adaptive signiﬁcance because it enables organisms to exert effort
to overcome obstacles or work-related response costs that sepa-
rate them from biologically relevant stimuli (Van den Bos et al.,
2006). We are tempted to make some parallel here between these
diverse neuroscience interpretations and Jadin’s (2012/2009, p. 58)
psychoanalytic “little bit of jouissance” which is nevertheless nec-
essary to face the“demands of life (Not des Lebens)”which are such
“that the nervous system needs to gather a reserve amount to face
them.” In this light, it is interesting to stress that DA systems are
activated not only by positive stimuli, but also by aversive, painful
and stressful stimuli and events (Berridge and Robinson, 1998;
Salamone et al., 2007). Indeed, both rewarding and aversive situa-
tions require an increase in general motivation to energize actions
and to ensure that they are executed properly. This ﬁts with the
clinical observation that jouissance can also be tied to actionswhich
were (once) adequate not simply in obtaining pleasure (rewarding
situations) but also in avoiding displeasure (aversive situations).
This brings an answer to our third point, namely that the effect
of the DA is (also) on the level of the actions involved by the
stimulus rather than (exclusively) on the stimulus itself. When
Bromberg-Martin et al. (2010, p. 8) say that DA neurons are crit-
ical in motivating effort to achieve high-value goals, he adds “and
(in) translating knowledge of task demands into reliable motor
performance.” As a result, the organism will search the stimulus
and “learn actions to seek it again in the future” (our Italics). Fur-
thermore, Berridge (2007, p. 408) proposes that the DA tags the
unexpectedly rewarding actions with “incentive value,”which “is a
separate form of value added to neural representations of learned
signals that predict hedonic reward and which translates the mere
prediction into motivation. Incentive salience attribution makes a
speciﬁc associated stimulus or action into an object of desire15 and
can tag a speciﬁc behavior as the rewarded response the individual
is motivated to perform.”Representations of motor processes and
cognitive processes are put into chunks in order to mark events
14This transition is conveyed through DA signalling, which appears to code for a so-
called “reward prediction error,”which has been proposed to act as a teaching signal
that underlies reinforcement learning (Schultz, 1998). However, Berridge (2007),
on the basis of a series of empirical observations, refutes the causal role of DA in
(reinforcement) learning and proposes that, in order to explain why mesolimbic
dopamine neurons so elegantly ﬁre seemingly obeying prediction error equations,
they code an informational consequence of learning signals, reﬂecting learning and
prediction generated elsewhere in the brain rather than causing it. Salamone et al.
(2007) also distinguish a possible role for DA in learning from its motivational or
reward role.
15We can’t help but point out that even Berridge’s word choices become properly
psychoanalytic at times.
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as salient and induce appropriate action patterns (Salamone et al.,
2007). Although the neural mechanisms of priming are not fully
known,“generation of incentive salience is the dynamic process for
which mesolimbic DA neurotransmission may be most essential”
(Berridge, 2007, p. 412).
Taking all this together, we thinkwe have reasons to see parallels
between Freud’s experience of satisfaction and the dopaminergic
attribution of incentive salience to reward-related actions. A dis-
tinctive feature between the Freudian model and the DA models
is that in the Freudian model the instigation (for motor acti-
vation) is more readily understood as coming from within the
organism, originating, e.g., from some homeostatic imbalance
situation, pushing to go ﬁnd reward, while in the DA models
the instigation is induced by some perceived stimulus, potentially
announcing a reward. However, one could conceive of both mod-
els as three-way connexions both implying all three, the bodily
need, the perceived stimulus or object16, and the motor pathway
to grasp it or interact with it. Indeed, Berridge (2007, p. 414, 413)
states it as follows: “the mesocorticolimbic circuitry (…) medi-
ates the integration of learned signals with hunger/satiety states
to dynamically transform the motivational value of stimuli” or
even more directly: “physiological deprivation states (…) moti-
vate and direct (behavior) chieﬂy by enhancing the motivational
and hedonic values of their relevant external incentive stimuli
and that is a function for which mesolimbic mechanisms may
be important.”
This last sentence resonates with “when the state of urgency
or wishing re-appears, the cathexis will also pass over on to the
two memories and will activate them,” the two memories being
the rewarding object or incentive stimulus and the motor pat-
tern of its associated behavior. As indicated, the precise role
of DA release in this dynamic is to fuel the organism by cre-
ating a state of motivation to seek reward, and this again is
strikingly close to the deﬁnition of jouissance we have proposed
in the framework of the experience of satisfaction, namely the
motor body tension instigated by the wishful activation. We
can also hear quite directly the neuroscience connexion between
reward and motivation in Freud’s (1955/1920 p. 23) statement:
“The compulsion to repeat and (drive) satisfaction which is
immediately pleasurable seem to converge here into an intimate
partnership.”
Excess of body tension: induce excess to the point of exhaustion
If jouissance is to be understood as equivalent to a state of motor
activation, then, by consequence, it is also equivalent to an increase
in body tension. Indeed, any action intention, be this action
actually executed, or simply imagined, remembered, prepared,
anticipated or even prevented (e.g., Jeannerod and Decety, 1995;
Decety, 1996; Gallese, 2000), leads to a slight increase in mus-
cle tension (ex. Yue and Cole, 1992). The actions which are
actually executed are only a fragment of all motor activations
continuously mobilising the body and causing muscle tension.
The idea of jouissance as (the beneﬁt from) a state of motor
16which would be “the Thing” in the psychoanalytic reading, see Excess of Body
Tension: “as the thing is identiﬁed – i.e., identiﬁed from a past experience of sat-
isfaction, as a potentially satisfying object – it induces body tension, which will be
needed to act upon it.”
activation, therefore leads us directly, following a physiologi-
cal logic, to the idea of sustained high levels of body tension,
corresponding to what seems to be put forward by Lacan as cen-
tral in the concept of jouissance, namely the implication of the
body.
What then about Lacan’s proposition of the closeness between
jouissance and the notions of excess and pain? It is interesting, in
this respect, to remember the ﬁrst observations implying the stim-
ulation of the nucleus accumbens. Indeed, in a well-known series
of experiments, Olds and Milner (1954) devised a system enabling
a rat to stimulate its own brain, by means of a lever connected to
an electrode implanted in the forebrain. Olds and Milner (1954)
describe that rats would continually press the lever in return for
receiving nothing more than a brief pulse of electrical stimula-
tion. It turned out that a similar effect was also produced when
the electrodes were implanted in the nearby nucleus accumbens
(Olds, 1956). The rats would press the lever frequently to receive
stimulation and would work so vigorously to self-administer stim-
ulations to the point of exhaustion and the exclusion of all other
activities (e.g., eating drinking, sex, and sleep). When, in the wake
of certain surgical procedures, similar stimulations were possible
for some human patients, it was indeed also observed that these
patients preferred this self-stimulation above all other activities.
But, curiously, this stimulation was not associated with any exter-
nal sign of pleasure: no smile or relaxed face, or any other sign of
tangible happiness, or subjective expression of a pleasant sensa-
tion (Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008, p. 15). It is for this reason
then that the term “reward” circuit was chosen rather than Olds
and Milner’s (1954) ﬁrst description of “pleasure center.”What is
moreover striking is that is again the same neurophysiologic axis,
the NAS-DA, which is implied here and that it reveals itself as
an axis which could, if circumvented (or “perverted;” ex. by self-
stimulation), easily lead to excess to the point of exhaustion and
self-harm.
To further strengthen this idea that the same mechanism, so
vitally important in driving the organism and in tagging adequate
actions, is also the mechanism which easily shifts toward harmful
effects, let’s go back to the role of the NAS-DA in inducing body
tension. Indeed, the situation of self-stimulation is artiﬁcial and
therefore not common. However, let’s remember that DA is not
generally released during the consummatory phase, but in advance
of it, inducing a state of motor tension leading the organism to
move toward the rewarding stimulus. In that sense it is interesting
to note that, e.g., Kupfermann et al. (2000) comment that this
anticipation, or motor tension, translated by the mesolimbic DA
ﬁring, can be interpreted as a deﬁcit, inducing an anxiogenic state
of tension, rather than being already rewarding per se. For all these
reasons, we contend to say that in the same way as for jouissance
where the boundary between enjoyment and pain seems ﬂimsy,
the mesolimbic NAS-DA functioning might be so built that it
is in a constant instable balancing between reward and anxiety.
Moreover, in both cases it is the part of the body tension which
actually can go into effectively executed action, and therefore into
discharge, which limits the build-up of tension, and therefore of
pain or anxiety. This then could be some physiological counterpart
of the psychoanalytic idea of pleasure functioning as a limit to
jouissance (Lacan, 1991/1969–1970).
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HISTORY
Commemoration of a trait, complying to repeat: incentive
sensitization
As concerns the history dimension of jouissance, we will elabo-
rate on Robinson and Berridge’s “incentive sensitization” theory
since this theory not only entails the tagging effect of DA release
but more speciﬁcally the structural inscription aspects of the DA
reward system and therefore seems to be in an ideal position to
translate the speciﬁcally historical dimension of jouissance. Indeed,
when Robinson and Berridge ﬁrst present their incentive sensiti-
zation theory of addiction in 1993, they proposed that the most
important of the psychological changes in addiction is a “sensi-
tization” or hypersensitivity, i.e., long-lasting adaptations in the
mesolimbic NAS-DA. Addictive drugs share the ability to produce
persistent neuroadaptations that render these regions hypersen-
sitive. The data suggest that sensitization may involve more than
a simple up- or down-regulation of biochemical processes, but
it may involve changes in patterns of synaptic connectivity in
brain reward systems, changes that may be similar to those seen
in other neural systems in association with other forms of experi-
ence dependent plasticity (Robinson and Kolb, 1997, 1999). This
is accompanied by an increase in spine density on the distal den-
drites of these cells. These neuroadaptations in DA/accumbens
systems speciﬁcally, then produce a pathological motivation for
drugs, called compulsive “wanting.”
Several points of this incentive sensitization theory are impor-
tant in the current perspective. First, as a consequence of the
dissociation between liking and wanting, the authors stress the fact
that this theory does not simply account for the addiction by the
positive and/or negative reinforcement value of the drugs, i.e., the
addiction is not simply due to the desire to experience the positive
hedonic effects of the drugs and/or to avoid aversive withdrawal
symptoms, as proposed in other theories (e.g., Koob et al., 1989;
Markou et al., 1993). The incentive salience theory explicitly shifts
the hypothesis away from the conjonctural reinforcement aspect
toward the structural alterations aspects. For example, Robinson
and Berridge (2000, p. S96) state: “Perhaps the most remarkable
feature of sensitization is its persistence. Once they have been sen-
sitized, animals may remain hypersensitive to the psychomotor
activating effects of drugs for months or years.” In other words
still, it is clear that the wanting circuit not only operates as a driv-
ing, and sometimes rewarding, system, but it is also sensitive to
long lasting adaptations, i.e., to historical imprint. This, then, is
coherent with the historical dimension of jouissance deﬁned by
“this mark, consisting of the drive presenting itself with a cer-
tain insistence, in its status of referring to something memorable
because it was remembered” (Lacan, 1986/1959–1960, p. 209).
Further, the incentive sensitization theory also includes several
aspects, which makes this theory a truly psychological theory. First,
the theory of Robinson andBerridge (2000, p. S105) fully acknowl-
edges the functional status of representations in this incentive
salience process, e.g., “It is further hypothesized that the psycho-
logical process that leads to “wanting” involves the attribution of
attractive salience to stimuli and their representations, a process
we call incentive salience attribution. (...) We have suggested it is
the process of incentive salience attribution that transforms the
sensory features of ordinary stimuli or, more accurately, the neural
and psychological representations of stimuli, so that they become
especially salient stimuli, stimuli that “grab the attention,” that
become especially attractive and wanted, thus approach and guid-
ing behavior to the goal.” This role for representations is also
logical in a action-centred rather than a stimulus-centred per-
spective, since it is known that preparation of an action as well
as anticipation, imagination, remembering etc. of that action
share a common motor imagery (Decety, 1996) and that this
imagery could be the substrate of its representation (Jeannerod,
1994). Second, these representations can also be unconscious. For
example, in addicts, doses of drugs that are too low to pro-
duce any conscious experience of pleasure can activate implicit
wanting as indicated by an increase in drug-seeking behavior.
Robinson and Berridge (2000, p. S104) propose: “the incentive-
sensitization theory holds that drugs can activate positive core
processes of motivation in the absence of conscious awareness, so
that positive effects may not be indicated on any scale of subjec-
tive affective intensity. Indeed, the neural system responsible for
incentive salience attribution can sometimes produce wanting, in
the absence of conscious awareness of wanting itself (Robinson
and Berridge, 2000, p. S105; see also Berridge, 1996, 1999). For
example, the brief subliminal (i.e., unconscious) presentation of
faces expressing positive emotions can activate implicit wanting
increasing subsequent consumption of a beverage (Berridge and
Winkielman, 2003). Robinson and Berridge (2000, p. S106) add:
“Activation of this system (...) can act sometimes as an unconscious
motivational process.” In other words, the incentive salience the-
ory can account for an unconscious representation unconsciously
inducing an intentional body investment or motor tension – which
is, in our opinion, also a highly psychoanalytic idea. The sensi-
tized pathways, the neuroadaptations in the wanting system, are
not simply sitting there, but form an active past, which has the
continuous potential to press for action., i.e., which “unsubdued,
pushes ever forward.”
In this incentive salience framework, the clinical link between
wanting and jouissance is quite direct: when the wanting system
is activated implicitly, it can instigate and guide behavior with-
out a person necessarily having conscious emotion, desire, or a
declarative goal (Robinson and Berridge, 2003, p. 36). This kind
of perplexity pertains clinically to a whole variety of behaviors
which people persist in having, even if they are neither plea-
surable, reasonable nor desirable, and even if they are negative
or destructive. This is keenly observed in clinics: addicts main-
tain their consumption while they “may report they are miserable,
their life is in ruins, and that even the drug is not that great any-
more. They are themselves bewildered by the intensity of their own
compulsive behavior17” (Robinson and Berridge, 2000, p. S106).
Often the addict describes his behavior as simply an overwhelm-
ingly strong craving that cannot be denied. Strikingly, these are
the very type of clinical observations which have originally led to
the necessity of thinking the concept of jouissance in psychoanal-
ysis. Moreover, addiction has often been the terrain par excellence
for the psychoanalytic description of jouissance (Braunstein, 1992;
17And the authors add this very psychoanalytic observation: “Indeed, addicts prob-
ably have no more insight into what motivates their daily behavior than do the rest
of us; which is arguably, not much.”
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Delourmel, 2009), with as a basic tenet that it is not the plea-
sure of the consumption but the jouissance, which ties the subject
to his addiction. Robinson and Berridge (2000, p. S105) under-
stand reward starting as the combination of liking and wanting
but stress that unlike the wanting systems, the neural systems that
mediates the subjective pleasurable effects of drugs do not appear
to sensitize. They add: “This may be why addiction is character-
ized by an increasing dissociation between the incentive value of
drugs (how much they are wanted) and their subjective pleasur-
able effects (how much they are liked). With the development of
an addiction drugs become pathologically wanted (“craved”) and
this can occur even if drugs are liked less and less.” Again, the
parallel with a psychoanalytic reading is striking: the reward as
the combination of liking and wanting could correspond to the
inaugural moment of jouissance, marking the adequate act which
also brings pleasure. The dissociation between pleasure and enjoy-
ment, moreover, could resonate with so-called morbid jouissance
which accounts for the persistence of behaviors, which may18 once
have been adequate. However, even if they are no longer pleasur-
able, since they were effectively registered in memory, they will
not fade away but will persist and push for their repetition, while
most often remaining beyond conscious understanding (see also
Johnson, 2008). Indeed, as said (see Commemoration of a Trait,
Complying to Repeat), jouissance can persist independently of the
object and action still being adequate in respect to the body need
or drive from which they historically originated.
CONCLUSION
In other words, it seems that the parallels between the different
dimensions of the psychoanalytic concept of jouissance and the
different aspects of the NAS-DA physiology are quite striking. At
the level of the body, theNAS-DAhas been proposed to function as
18Or may not : Indeed, in Beyond the pleasure principle Freud (1955/1920) explains
how a subject may also comply to repeat actions which were never pleasurable or
adequate in the ﬁrst place. He further indicates that the binding effect, which is a ﬁrst
necessary step toward discharge, is in this repetition probably the decisive element.
In other words, acting upon a traumatic experience, even if this action is inadequate
in bringing relief, is, in and by itself better than sideration, because the mere action
channels the threatening accumulation of quantities toward a dischargeable motor
form.
a basic drive system much in the same way as described by Freud;
jouissance then ariseswhen this systemgoes awry, namelywhen the
action is invested in and for itself, which is structurally bound to
happen, as is shown in the phenomena of e.g., autoshaping. The
NAS-DA is also the body system which tags actions which have
brought (unexpected) reward and as a result of this tagging, a new
encounter with the incentive stimulus will fuel a reserve of body
energy motivating the organism to search the reward (or to avoid
the aversive situation). This highly resonates with Freud’s experi-
ence of satisfaction where either a bodily need, or a new encounter
with “the Thing,” will reactivate the mnemic motor image for
action upon this “Thing.” The tension induced by this reactiva-
tion, again,we have referred to as jouissance. Third, themesolimbic
NAS-DA is also the axis which functions in a constant instable bal-
ancing between reward and anxiety, reﬂecting the ﬂimsy boundary
between enjoyment and pain described for jouissance. At the level
of the (organism’s) history, the NAS-DA is the central operator in
the so-called incentive salience theory, which describes how neu-
roadaptations due to reward can sensitize selectively the wanting
system while leaving the hedonics or liking unchanged. This the-
ory could therefore account for Lacan’s historical dimension of
jouissance deﬁned as a mark referring to something memorable
and commemorating an irruption of enjoyment. In both theo-
ries the memory traces relentlessly push for action, i.e., push for
their repetition, which can explain the perplexifying persistence
of behavior while it is no longer pleasurable, and even when it
becomes damaging, such as in addiction. For all these reasons,
jouissance could be described as an accumulation of body tension,
fuelling for action, but continuously balancing between reward
and anxiety, and both marking the physiology of the body with
the history of its commemoration and arising from this inscription
as a constant push to act and to repeat. Moroever, it seems that the
mesolimbic NAS-DA is a reasonable candidate for its underlying
physiological architecture.
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